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Kase: $500,000 Cap On Non-Economic Damages for Medical Malpractice Inco

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Open Courts-$500,000 Cap On
Non-Economic Damages For Medical Malpractice
Inconsistent With Open Courts Guarantee
In Texas Constitution.
Lucas v. United States,
31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423 (May 11, 1988).
Christopher Lucas became paralyzed at the age of fourteen months following an injection administered in an El Paso Army hospital.' His parents
sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 2 A federal district court subsequently found the method of injection negligent and ordered
damages that included a $1,500,000 award to Christopher for pain and suffering.3 From the pain and suffering damages, the court subtracted $400,000
to account for an out-of-court settlement made by a second defendant, Wyeth Laboratories.4 At $1.1 million, the pain and suffering award still ex1. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 424 (May 11, 1988). Christopher's
parents took him to William Beaumont Army Medical Center when the toddler developed a
swollen neck and fever. Id. Diagnosing Christopher's problem as a thyroglossal cyst, an
Army doctor ordered an injection of Bicillin LA, a penicillin product that almost immediately
caused the boy's legs to become mottled. Doctors attributed the discoloration to an allergic
reaction and gave injections to counteract the reaction. Hours later, however, Christopher's
parents discovered their son's legs no longer moved when he cried. Hospital tests over the next
few days indicated paralysis. A subsequent operation confirmed the paralysis and attributed it
to the penicillin injection, which was made directly into an artery and thus deprived the nerves
controlling Christopher's legs of necessary blood. Id.
2. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Subsection (b) of the Federal Tort Claims Act gives United States district courts original jurisdiction when citizens sue
the federal government for money damages due to personal injuries, property loss or death
caused by a government employee who, in the course of his job, acted negligently, wrongfully
or failed to act. Id.
3. See Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 424. Other damages awarded at trial included
$498,628.72 to Christopher's parents for their son's past and future medical expenses until he
is eighteen years old, $350,000 to Christopher as the present value of the medical expenses
anticipated for his adulthood, and $600,000 to Christopher as the present value of his reduced
adult earning capacity. Id. Christopher's parents also unsuccessfully claimed pain and suffering damages. Id.
4. See id. Wyeth Laboratories manufactured Bicillin LA, the drug Christopher received
in his first injection, and packaged it in its own syringe. Id. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed, the trial court's act of reducing the total damage award
by the amount of Wyeth Laboratories' settlement was "consistent with the total-offset method
of discounting." Id. When a plaintiff settles out-of-court with one of multiple tortfeasors and
the settlement only partially satisfies the plaintiff's total damages, the settlement amount
serves to reduce the damages recoverable against the remaining tortfeasors. See RESTATE-
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ceeded the $500,000 ceiling imposed by Texas law on non-economic
damages for medical malpractice,5 but the court held the limit did not apply
to federally operated hospitals.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's finding on appeal7 and held that the
damage limit did not violate federal constitutional provisions for due process
and equal protection.' When the Fifth Circuit panel considered the limit's
constitutionality under the same clauses within the Texas Constitution, how-

MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 885 comment e (1977)(payments by one tortfeasor before judg-

ment credited to remaining tortfeasors); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 49 at 333-35 (5th ed. 1984)(under release,
amount paid by one tortfeasor diminishes amount other tortfeasors owe).
5. See Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 424. Section 11.02 of the act, which was titled the
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, capped civil liability for noneconomic damages at $500,000 in medical malpractice cases against a physician or health care
provider. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
This amount was to be adjusted for increases or decreases in the federal Consumer Price Index.
Id. § 11.04. The statute specifically exempted claims for past and future medical and custodial
care from the limitation. Id. § 11.03. This is why it is called a non-medical damages cap,
although that label may be too narrow. See Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 424.
6. See Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 424. The district court's decision rested on the fact
that section 11.02 of the statute limits damages only for "physicians" or "health care providers." See Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1986)(citing TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (Vernon Supp. 1988)). Because United States government hospitals did not fall into the statutory definitions for either group, the district court held the limit
did not apply to such hospitals. Id.; see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)
(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(hospital defined as any entity licensed or chartered by state of Texas).
7. See Lucas, 807 F.2d at 423. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the damage limit applied
to United States government hospitals because the Federal Tort Claims Act requires the federal government to have the same liability and privileges as private tortfeasors in Texas. Id. at
417. Because Texas law enforces the damage award limit for health care providers and physicians, the Fifth Circuit held that federally operated hospitals in Texas were entitled to the
same limit. Id. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982)(United States liable in same manner as
private individual); FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982)(government liable as private person would be under laws of state where injury occurred).
8. See Lucas, 807 F.2d at 421-22 (damage limit accords with federal due process and
equal protection). The Fifth Circuit found the Texas damage limit did not violate either the
due process or equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. Id. The court reasoned that the due process rights of Christopher Lucas had not been abrogated because the
Constitution had never prevented legislatures from abolishing old common-law rights as long
as the legislative purpose was permissible. In examining the equal protection issue, the Fifth
Circuit applied the rational relationship test and determined that the Texas Legislature had
both a rational basis for establishing the limit and a legitimate goal. See id. (legislative basis
for law was scarceness and high cost of medical malpractice insurance and assurance that
doctors of all specialties could practice in Texas); see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978)(United States Constitution does not forbid
abolition of old common-law rights); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961)
(statutory discrimination does not violate equal protection clause if basis for law relevant to
state objective).
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ever, the court found Texas case law unclear. 9 The court certified' ° two
questions to the Texas Supreme Court: 1) whether Texas' cap on non-economic damages for medical malpractice was in accord with the Texas Constitution; and 2) whether the cap, if constitutional, limited each defendant's
liability or each claimant's recovery." Held - Unconstitutional. A $500,000
cap on non-economic damages for medical malpractice is inconsistent with

9. See Lucas, 807 F.2d at 418 (court uncertain whether damage limit would accord with
Texas Constitution). Although the damage limit had been declared unconstitutional by several
Texas appellate courts and one United States district court in the Northern District of Texas,
the Texas Supreme Court never had addressed the law's validity under the state constitution.
Id.; cf. Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1108 (N.D. Tex. 1986)(cap unconstitutional
on both state and federal equal protection grounds and on state open courts grounds); Brownsville Medical Center v. Gracia, 704 S.W.2d 68, 80 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(cap violates equal protection and open courts guarantees); Detar Hosp. v. Estrada, 694
S.W.2d 359, 365-66 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ)(cap unconstitutional on equal
protection and open courts grounds); Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Hobrecht, 685 S.W.2d 739, 753
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ dism'd by agr.)(cap does not apply to pharmacies and
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds); Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Tex., Inc. v. Baber,
672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984)(cap violates equal protection and does not
apply to hospital defendants), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 714 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1986). The
state constitutional question is important because state constitutions may expand the individual rights provided by the United States Constitution. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335,
338 (Tex. 1986)(Texas Constitution gives more rights than federal constitution). Individuals
may thus enjoy greater protections as citizens of a particular state than they would merely as
United States citizens. Id.
10. See Lucas v. United States, 811 F.2d 270, 271 (5th Cir. 1987)(Texas Supreme Court
asked to determine whether damage limit violated state constitution and whether it applied to
claimants or defendants). The Fifth Circuit certified the questions under a relatively new procedure authorized by Texas voters in 1985 in the form of a constitutional amendment. Id. The
amendment, now article V, section 3-c of the Texas Constitution, gave both the Texas Supreme
Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals "jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified from a federal appellate court." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3-c(a). However, rule of appellate
procedure 114 gives both courts the discretion to decline to answer certified questions. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 114(a) (courts can refuse to answer certified question).
11. See Lucas, 811 F.2d at 271. The Fifth Circuit found the Texas case law confusing on
the question of the limit's constitutionality, and, therefore, incorrectly predicted how the Texas
Supreme Court would analyze the issue. Compare Lucas, 807 F.2d at 421 (projection that
Texas Supreme Court would find Texas statute constitutional) with Lucas v. United States, 31
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 421, 424 (May 11, 1988)(Texas Supreme Court holds statute unconstitutional).
Observing that the court refused to grant a writ of error to review Baber, the Fifth Circuit
surmised that the Texas high court would not join its state appellate courts in finding the
damages limit unconstitutional. See Lucas, 807 F.2d at 419 (writ of error first granted, then
dismissed, because Texas Supreme Court believed law constitutional). The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Texas Supreme Court could find that the damage limit accorded with the due
process requirement under the Texas Constitution because citizens do not have a vested right
in the retention of common-law rules. Id. at 421-22. Concerning the equal protection challenge, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the state legislature's broad power to make classifications
meant the Texas Supreme Court was unlikely to find the legislative purpose for the damages
cap unreasonable or arbitrary. Id. at 421.
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the open courts guarantee in the Texas Constitution. 12
Commonly known as Texas' open courts guarantee, article I, section 13 of
the Texas Constitution declares: "All courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law."' 13 The provision emanates from England's
Magna Charta,"4 which in 1215 delineated rights that the colonists later
took to America and to Texas. 5 The United States Constitution never incorporated the open courts guarantee, 16 although today it is found in
twenty-seven state constitutions. 17 Texans wrote the provision into the
state's first constitution in 1836 and it has remained intact despite several

12. See Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 424 (May 11, 1988). Because it determined the
subject of the first certified question was unconstitutional, the Texas Supreme Court determined it need not answer the second certified question, which asked whether the cap specifically limited liability or recovery. Id.
13. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; cf.J. JAMES & C. STEBBINGS, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL
QUOTATIONS 28 no. 12 (1987)(citing to T. FULLER, GNOMOLOGIA, no. 2,486 (n.p. 1732)

("Hell and Chancery are always open")).
14. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984)(Magna Charta
source of open courts guarantee). The applicable portion of the Magna Charta, Chapter 40,
states: "To none will we sell, to none deny or delay, right or justice." Id.; see also 1 G.
BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 47 (1977)(open courts guarantee derived directly from Magna Charta); J.
SAYLES, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 10-16 (1888)(text of Magna Charta).
15. See I G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3 (1977)(Magna Charta ideals instilled in colonists who came

to America and established open courts guarantee in Texas). Though the colonists brought to
America the ideals voiced in the Magna Charta, the specific guarantee of open courts never
was incorporated into the United States Constitution. See id.; see also Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. at 426 (open courts guarantee brought from Magna Charta to America by colonists); LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986)(Magna Charta guarantee of open courts
came to America via colonists); J. SAYLES, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS 57-

77 (1888)(comparison of United States Constitution and Texas Constitution shows no open
courts clause in federal constitution).
16. See I G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 51 (1977)(United States Constitution does not guarantee right
to open courts).

17. See LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL AND STATE, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES
AND RIGHTS, A 50-STATE INDEX 54 (Jan. 1980). Twenty-seven states included an open courts
guarantee in their constitutions. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6;
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 18; IND. CONST. art. I, § 12; KY. CONST. amend. 14; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16; NEB. CONST. art.
I, § 13; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 22; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 16; OR. CONST. art. I, § 10; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 20; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. art. II, § 28; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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constitutional revisions."8
The importance of Texas' open courts provision lies not so much in its
promise of open courts per se,' 9 but in its guarantee of "remedy by due

course of law," 20 which Texas courts have interpreted as a due process guarantee broader than that in the federal constitution." The Texas provision
affords greater protection by applying a test that mirrors the substantive due
process" analysis by inquiring whether the Texas Legislature: 1) possessed
18. See 1 G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 47 (1977). Section 13 entered the Texas Constitution in 1836
as Section 11, but in 1876 it was readopted as Section 13. Id. Despite the section change, the
wording of both the open courts and the due process guarantees has not changed since their
introduction into the constitution. Id.; see also W. HARRIS, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE
OF TEXAS 114 (1913)(open courts guarantee in Section 13 in 1876).
19. 1 G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 50 (1977). The promise of open courts is viewed as substantially the
same as the guarantee of redress of grievances simply because the latter cannot be obtained if
the courts are closed. Id.; see also O'Shea v. Twohig, 9 Tex. 336, 341-42 (1852)(seminal open
courts case holding that plaintiff entitled to redress when courts do not exist in newly created
county).
20. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
21. See Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1108 (N.D. Tex. 1986)(due process in
Texas' open courts guarantee broader than federal guarantee of due process); see also LeCroy
v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 340-41 (Tex. 1986)(open courts guarantee a due process provision); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664-66 (Tex. 1983)(open courts guarantee a due process
guarantee); 1 G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED

AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 50 (1977)(open courts guarantee of remedy by due course of
law is due process guarantee). The Texas Constitution also guarantees due process in article I,
section 19, but this guarantee of "due course of the law" is considered separate from section 13
in history, meaning and protection. Id. at 50-51, 69 (due process within open courts guarantee
deals with access to courts and is different from article I, section 19 which is procedural in
nature). Although both section 13 and section 19 are traceable to the Magna Charta, section
19 emanates directly from Chapter 39 of the charter and establishes what is commonly known
as procedural due process. Id. at 13-19. Procedural due process means the state must observe
due process of law when seizing an individual or his property. Thus, section 19 governs the
relationship between the individual and the state, while section 13 regulates the individual's
access to the courts. Id. at 50-51, 67-69.
22. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4 at 357
(3rd ed. 1986)(substantive due process enables strict examination of legislative actions affecting
fundamental liberties); see also Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 198, 275 S.W.2d
951, 953 (1955)(legislative acts that withdraw common-law rights of redress sustained only
when reasonable alternative remedy is substituted and legislative act not unreasonable nor
arbitrary); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 212, 48 S.W.2d 944, 948 (1932)(statute
that unreasonably blocks justiciable right of redress violates due process under open courts
guarantee). Contra 1 G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 71 (1977)(substantive due process analysis rarely utilized by Texas courts). The United States Supreme Court first utilized substantive due process
to review economic regulations. See Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton, 295 U.S. 330, 357-62
(1935)(when property taken by legislative act, due process requires that statute not be arbitrary
nor deny reasonable substitute for property taken). Today, however, both the United States
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unreasonable or arbitrary objectives in passing a statute that 2) abridged a
"cognizable common-law cause of action." 23 The open courts guarantee enables the legislature to considerably restrict the right of redress as long as a

reasonable alternative remedy or quid pro quo is provided 24
The Texas equal protection clause, which has been in the state constitution as long as the open courts guarantee, provides an additional shield
against unreasonable and arbitrary legislative action. 25 Like its federal coun-

terpart,2 6 Texas' equal protection clause subjects legislatively made, discrim-

Supreme Court and the Texas Supreme Court seem inclined to review the violation of a fundamental right by using a test incorporating the essential elements of substantive due process.
See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 426 (May 11, 1988)(when legislature
partially blocks or eliminates right of redress, open courts guarantee demands that legislature
not be arbitrary nor fail to provide adequate substitute); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7 at 367 (regulation of fundamental right subject to due
process review); see also United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)(presumption of constitutionality may be narrower when legislation violates civil liberty); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7 at 367 (Carolene Products
interpreted as enabling substantive due process to be used to protect individual rights).
23. See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 665-66 (when justiciable right to remedy removed, open
courts guarantee requires action be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and reasonable substitute be implemented); see also Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. at 1108 (open courts inquiry protects
common-law right to remedy against unreasonable and arbitrary legislative action); 1 G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE

ANALYSIS 50 (1977)(open courts prompts query whether legislative removal of common-law
right to remedy arbitrary, unreasonable and adequate substitute provided).
24. See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 667 (statute that abridges right to redress can be neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary and must offer adequate substitute remedy or leave one at common
law); see also Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 927 (Tex. 1984)(Robertson, J., concurring)
(legislature cannot eliminate right to redress when no reasonable substitute established); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 109-10, 185 S.W. 556, 560 (1916)(legislature
supersedes common law because substitute remedy created). Quid pro quo literally means
"something for something." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (5th ed. 1979). As a legal
term, it stands for the concept of giving one valuable item for another. Id. Under the open
courts guarantee, the quid pro quo concept requires the substitution of a reasonable alternative
when a right to remedy is removed. See Waggoner, 647 F.Supp. at 1108 (reasonable substitute
must be supplied when common-law right to remedy removed); Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at
426 (abrogation of right to remedy requires creation of reasonable substitute). Much debate
remains over the sort of quid pro quo that must be provided. Compare Smith v. Department of
Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987)(substitute remedy must specifically affect those whose
rights were limited by malpractice damage cap) with Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695
P.2d 665, 681-82 & n.18 (Cal. 1985)(quid pro quo acceptable if affects society generally).
25. See 1 G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 13-14 (1977)(Texas equal protection clause in state constitution since 1836).
26. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (federal equal protection clause) with TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 3 (Texas equal protection clause). The Texas equal protection clause establishes that "[a]ll free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or
set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in considera-
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inatory classifications to one of four levels of constitutional review.27 The
highest level, strict scrutiny, requires the legislature to show a compelling
governmental interest when it restricts a fundamental right or burdens a suspect class.2" A legislative enactment that classifies according to gender or
legitimacy of birth falls into the intermediate level of scrutiny, which requires the classification to be substantially related to an important governmental goal.2 9 When a fundamental right or suspect class is not involved,
the legislature must merely meet the lowest level of scrutiny, known as the
rational relationship test.3" This test requires the government to demon-

tion of public services." TEX. CONST. art I, § 3. The federal equal protection clause requires
that a state not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV.
27. See Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985)(Texas equal protection
clause enables review of discriminatory classifications made by legislature); Comment, Medical
Liability and InsuranceImprovement Act of Texas: The New Legislative Procedurefor Amputation of Patients'Rights, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 481, 507-08 (1978)(equal protection clause measures constitutionality of legislative classifications). The Texas Supreme Court has followed the
United States Supreme Court's lead in the levels of scrutiny applied to discriminatory classification. See Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 429 (May 23, 1988)(Gonzalez, J., dissenting)
(Texas Supreme Court follows United States Supreme Court's method of equal protection
scrutiny). Accordingly, the Texas equal protection clause offers no more protection than its
federal counterpart. Id.; see also 1 G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 13-18 (1977)(Texas and federal
equal protection clauses provide same protections). Conversely, the Texas open courts guarantee offers greater protection to Texas citizens because the federal constitution does not have a
similar provision. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338, 340-41 (Tex. 1986)(open
courts guarantee gives Texas citizens additional rights).
28. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982)(strict scrutiny applies to classifications based on suspect classes or fundamental rights); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)(tiers of equal protection test detailed). Whether a
right is fundamental depends on whether the Constitution identifies it as such, implicitly or
explicitly. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973)(determination of fundamental right status hinges on how United States Constitution identifies it);
see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)(fundamental right to travel infringed
by statute requiring one year state residency prior to receiving welfare benefits). Today, a
suspect classification is one that divides individuals according to race or alienage. See
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (race, alienage or national origin classifications require strict scrutiny); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)(statute forbidding interracial marriages
impermissibly created discriminatory classification).
29. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 (gender and legitimacy classifications must
have substantial relation to important governmental interest); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
210 (1976)(statute forbidding males to buy beer under age 21 while allowing 18-21 year-old
females to do so not substantially related to important governmental interest); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968)(statute denying illegitimate children standing to bring wrongful
death lawsuit not substantially related to important governmental interest).
30. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42 (rational relationship test used whenever statute does not classify by race, alienage, origin, gender or illegitimacy); Fashing, 457 U.S. at 963
(rational relationship distinction applies to state classifications outside of fundamental rights
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strate a rational relationship between the classification and a legitimate state
end. 3 ' In recent years, the United States Supreme Court and the Texas
Supreme Court have put more "bite" 32 into the rational relationship inquiry
by examining the arbitrariness of the state's purpose, particularly when a
regulation protects an economic interest.33
The arbitrariness inquiry within the rational relationship-with-bite test resembles the second prong of the open courts test, which inquires whether the
legislature abridged a recognized cause of action at common law. 34 How-

and race); Whitworth, 699 S.W.2d at 197 (legislative classifications must be rationally related
to statutory purpose); see also 1 G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 17-18 (1977)(describes classifications that

fall under rational relationship test); Comment, Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act of Texas: The New Legislative Procedurefor Amputation ofPatients' Rights, 30 BAYLOR L.
REV. 481, 508-09 (1978)(details when rational relationship test applies).
31. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 429 (May 11, 1988)(Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting) (legislative classification must be rationally related to legitimate governmental objective); see also Vance v. Bradley, 404 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979)(unless legislative classification
affects fundamental right or suspect class, must be rationally related to legitimate state interest). Texas courts follow the federal courts' lead in applying the rational relationship test to
discriminatory classifications. See Spring Branch Indep. School Dist. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d
556, 559-60 (Tex. 1985)(rational relationship test for federal equal protection clause also applies to Texas Constitution article I, section 3); Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983)(state standards of review for constitutionality under Texas Constitution
must at least approximate federal standard of review).
32. See Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by any Other Name, 62
IND. L.J. 779, 779-80 (1987)(heightened rational relationship scrutiny known as rational basis
test with bite); see also Stewart, A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, 71 A.B.A. J. 108, 112-14
(1985)(quoting Victor Rosenblum of Northwestern University Law School who states stricter
rational relationship inquiry has given the test "teeth").
33. See Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1985)(reasonableness of legislative action part of rational relationship scrutiny); Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex.
1985)(unreasonableness signalled when legislative classification overinclusive); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881-82 (1985)(court may inquire into reasons
behind legislative classification). Texas may have been ahead of the United States Supreme
Court in putting "teeth" into the rational relationship test, particularly with regard to economic regulations. Compare Ward, 470 U.S. at 871-83 (among first economic cases to which
Court applied "bite") with Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. City of Dallas, 98 Tex. 396, 397-420, 84
S.W. 648, 649-56 (1905)(early Texas case employing rational relationship with bite "test"). As
early as 1905, the Texas Supreme Court was emphasizing whether a regulation's interference
with the economic system was "unwarranted or arbitrary." See Houston & TC Ry. Co., 84
S.W. at 654; 1 G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 17-18 (1977)(Texas rational relationship inquiry has long had

bite when economics cases reviewed); see also San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty, 156 Tex.
574, 579, 297 S.W.2d 813, 815-17 (1957)(law prohibiting grocery store loss leaders arbitrary
and unreasonable classification); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. City of Georgetown, 428 S.W.2d
405, 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968, no writ)(ordinance regulating gasoline tank truck size
subject to review for arbitrariness and unreasonableness).
34. Compare Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Tex. 1983)(when justiciable right
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ever, the difference between the open courts and equal protection inquiries is
that the open courts guarantee protects a clear right to a remedy, while the
equal protection inquiry affects only discriminatory government classifications.3" Because discriminatory classifications may involve the removal of a
right to remedy, federal courts in Texas and the Texas Supreme Court have
applied the equal protection and open courts tests in tandem.3 6 These standards are important when analyzing the constitutionality of statutes that cap
medical malpractice damages.37
When the Texas Legislature approved the non-economic damage limit in
1977, lawmakers believed they were responding to a malpractice insurance
"crisis" that had reached Texas after sweeping the nation. 3' Health care

to remedy removed open courts guarantee requires that action be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and requires reasonable substitute) with Williams, 472 U.S. at 22-23 (reasonableness of
legislative classification part of rational relationship inquiry).
35. Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)(equal protection scrutinizes discriminatory classifications) with LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 341 (Tex. 1986)(open courts
provision scrutinizes whether litigants receive day in court). See also Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 406 (Idaho 1976)(equal protection tests legislative classifications,
while substantive due process examines removal of common law rights); Comment, Medical
Liability and InsuranceImprovement Act of Texas: The New Legislative Procedurefor Amputation of Patients' Rights, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 481, 508 (1978)(explaining difference between
due process and equal protection inquiries); cf. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 n.33 at 536-37 (3rd ed. 1986)(explaining that procedural due process and equal protection inquiries often confused).
36. See Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1105-08 (N.D. Tex. 1986)(Texas noneconomic damages limit struck down on both state equal protection and open courts grounds);
LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338-41 (Tex. 1986)(increased lawsuit filing fee violated
state equal protection and open courts guarantees).
37. See, e.g., Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. at 1103-08 (1986)(constitutionality of Texas medical malpractice damages cap measured against standards for state and federal equal protection
and state open courts guarantee); Detar Hosp., Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359, 365-66 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(Texas damages cap found unconstitutional on
equal protection and open courts grounds); see also Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d
585, 594-600 (Ind. 1980)(damages cap valid according to open courts and equal protection
inquiries). See generally Comment, Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of
Texas: The New Legislative Procedurefor Amputation ofPatients' Rights, 30 BAYLOR L. REV.
481, 502-05, 507-11 (1978)(non-economic damages cap analyzed according to due process and
equal protection inquiries).
38. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02(a)(1), (3) (Vernon Supp. 1988)
(findings and purposes of law indicate that medical malpractice lawsuits and settlements had
increased in frequency and severity from 1972-77); Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act - A Survey and Analysis of its History, Construction and Constitutionality, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1984)(Texas legislature responding to national
medical malpractice insurance crisis); Witherspoon, Constitutionalityof the Texas Statute Limiting Liabilityfor MedicalMalpractice, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 419, 445-52 (1979)(nationwide
medical malpractice insurance crisis had not yet reached state when legislature acted); see also
Note, Are The Damages of Medical Malpractice Victims Limited to $500,000 in Texas?, 28 S.
TEX. L.J. 161, 161 (1987)(law in reaction to statewide medical malpractice crisis).
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lobbyists reinforced this belief,39 as did the legislatively appointed Texas
Medical Professional Liability Study Commission.' In a statement of conclusions and objectives subsequently adopted by the legislature,4 1 the study
commission linked the frequency and severity of legitimate medical malpractice lawsuits to skyrocketing malpractice insurance premiums and the decision by some doctors to practice without insurance.42 Both Texas and

39. See Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act - A Survey
and Analysis of its History, Constructionand Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 266-67
(1984)(lobbyists, doctors and hospitals led legislature to believe that statewide medical malpractice insurance crisis existed).
40. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY STUDY

2-8 (December 1976)(available in Texas
Legislative Reference Library in Austin) (medical malpractice insurance crisis exists due to
several factors including litigiousness of society).
41. Compare FINAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY

COMMISSION TO THE 65TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE

STUDY COMMISSION TO THE 65TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE 2-8 (December 1976)(available in

Texas Legislative Reference Library in Austin) (causes of increased health care insurance costs
and effect on health care delivery system) with TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02
(Vernon Supp. 1988)(conditions and objectives leading to statute).
42. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02 (Vernon Supp. 1988Xfindings and

purposes of statute); Detar Hosp., Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359, 366 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(accepting purposes of statute as stated in section 1.02); FINAL
REPORT OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY STUDY COMMISSION TO THE

65TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE 3-8 (December 1976)(available in Texas Legislative Reference Library in Austin) (stating reasons for and goals of proposed statute); Keith, The Texas Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act - A Survey and Analysis of its History, Construction
and Constitutionality, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 266-68 (1984)(soaring malpractice insurance
rates blamed on litigation increase and large damage awards); Witherspoon, Constitutionality
of the Texas Statute Limiting Liabilityfor Medical Malpractice, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419,
445-46 (1979)(insurance rate increase blamed on increased litigation and higher damage
awards). The Texas Legislature believed the medical malpractice insurance "crisis" existed in
1975, when lawmakers enacted article 5.82 of the Insurance Code in order to eliminate the
"discovery rule" that extended the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims against
insured doctors. See Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act - A
Survey and Analysis of its History, Construction and Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265,
266-68 (1984)(article 5.82 response to pressure from health care profession over medical malpractice crisis). Never before had the legislature used special legislation to limit the rights of
medical malpractice victims. Id. Thus, article 5.82 was an outgrowth of the legislature's belief
that some sort of tort "reform" was the key to ending the crisis. However, the legislature
wanted more substantive "reform" than article 5.82 provided and, in that same legislative
session, appointed the Texas Medical Professional Liability Study Commission to study the
accepted-as-fact malpractice insurance "crisis" to recommend solutions. It also has been suggested that the legislature realized it was acting too quickly and believed a study commission
would add legitimacy to its actions. Id.; see also Witherspoon, Constitutionality of the Texas
Statute Limiting Liabilityfor MedicalMalpractice, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 447-48 n. 126.1
(1979)(legislature based actions on study commission's findings of crisis that did not in fact
exist). The resulting article 4590i incorporated the provisions of article 5.82 and repealed it.
Id. at 425; see also Professional Liability Insurance for Physicians, Podiatrists and Hospitals
Act, ch. 330, § 1, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 864, 864, repealed by Medical Liability and Insurance
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federal courts soon began applying the open courts guarantee to invalidate
parts of the statute that enacted the damage cap.4 3 These decisions attacked
section 10.01 of the statute, which imposed a blanket two-year statute of
limitations and eliminated the "discovery rule."" Scrutiny soon shifted to
the damage cap, which three state appellate courts and one federal district
court declared unconstitutional in a total of five cases.4" These courts held

Improvement Act, ch. 817, § 4f.03, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2064. The effects of article
5.82 were still being felt in 1984, when the Texas Supreme Court in Nelson v. Krusen declared
the statute's elimination of the "discovery rule" violative of the open courts guarantee. See
Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 921-23 (Tex. 1984)(two-year statute of limitations cuts off
cause of action before malpractice victim could reasonably know of injury). The constitutionality of article 5.82 was an issue on appeal because the plaintiff's cause of action accrued
between June 7, 1975 and August 29, 1977, the statutory "lifespan" of article 5.82. Id.; Keith,
The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act - A Survey and Analysis of its
History, Construction and Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 267 n.16 (1984)(article
5.82 enacted June 7, 1975 and repealed Aug. 29, 1977). The court found article 5.82 unconstitutional under the open courts guarantee because the statute totally foreclosed some malpractice victims' right to a remedy without offering them a quid pro quo or reasonable substitute.
See Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 923 (article 5.82 unconstitutionally removed common-law right to
remedy). A year earlier in Sax v. Votteler, the court had used similar reasoning in determining
that article 5.82 unconstitutionally removed the tolling of the two-year period of limitations in
medical malpractice actions by minors after reaching age six. Compare Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at
922 (removal of common-law right to remedy without providing reasonable substitute violates
open courts guarantee) with Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1983)(legislative removal of tolling provisions removes justiciable right to redress and requires substitution of
adequate alternative).
43. See, e.g., Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. 1985)(two-year limitation period
in section 10.01 of article 4590i violated open courts guarantee by removing ability to sue
within two-year statute of limitations); Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 920-23 (section 10.01 removes
common-law right to remedy because birth defect that would have been predicted by diagnostic test that was not made could not have been discovered in two years); Sax, 648 S.W.2d at
664 (section 10.01's removal of tolling of discovery rule for minors violates open courts provision by eliminating common-law right to remedy); Melendez v. Beal, 683 S.W.2d 869, 873
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ)(elimination of discovery rule violates
open courts provision when patient could not have discovered cause of action in two years).
But see Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. 1985)(two-year statute of limitations
constitutional when injury discoverable within two years); Reed v. Wershba, 698 S.W.2d 369,
371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ)(two-year limit constitutional when
plaintiff has reasonable opportunity to sue).
44. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988)(two-year
statute of limitations enacted in place of discovery rule).
45. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1104-08 (N.D. Tex. 1986)(damages
cap violates state and federal equal protection clauses and state open courts guarantee); Baptist
Hosp. of Southeast Tex., Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984)
(damages cap violates equal protection clause), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 714 S.W.2d 310
(Tex. 1986); Brownsville Medical Center v. Gracia, 704 S.W.2d 68, 80 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(non-economic damages cap violates state open courts and equal
protection guarantees); Detar Hosp., Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359, 365-66 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1985, no writ)(equal protection and open courts doctrines violated by damages
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the damage limit violated the federal equal protection clause in all five
cases.4 6 In three decisions, the courts held the limit also violated the Texas
equal protection clause.47 Only in Waggoner v. Gibson4 did the court find
the cap violated the Texas open courts guarantee.4 9

Texas has been joined by thirteen other states that enacted damage limits
in the wake of the medical malpractice insurance "crisis" in the mid1970's.5 ° In the mid-1980's, yet another malpractice insurance "crisis"

arose, prompting fourteen more states to adopt damage limits. 5 Though

cap); Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Hobrecht, 685 S.W.2d 739, 753 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985,
writ dism'd by agr.)(damages cap offends equal protection clause). Contra Rose v. Doctors
Hosp. Facilities, 735 S.W.2d 244, 248-51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ)(damages cap does
not offend open courts, procedural due process nor equal protection guarantees).
46. See Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. at 1104-05 (no rational relation between malpractice
insurance crisis and non-economic damages cap); Baber, 672 S.W.2d at 29 (no rational basis
for legislature to implement damages cap); Gracia, 704 S.W.2d at 80 (adopts Detar holding
that damage cap violates equal protection); Detar, 694 S.W.2d at 365 (equal protection violated by damages cap); Malone, 685 S.W.2d at 753 (damages cap offends equal protection
clause because no evidence of malpractice insurance crisis). ContraRose, 735 S.W.2d at 249-51
(damages cap does not violate equal protection guarantee).
47. See Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. at 1106 (unconstitutional under United States and Texas
equal protection clauses); Gracia, 704 S.W.2d at 80 (unconstitutional under United States and
Texas equal protection clauses); Detar, 694 S.W.2d at 365 (unconstitutional under United
States and Texas equal protection clauses).
48. 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
49. See Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. at 1108 (open courts guarantee violated because common-law cause of action displaced and no reasonable substitute provided).
50. See Farrell, Virginia's Medical Malpractice Cap and the Doctrine of Substantive Due
Process, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 684, 684-85 (1988)(damages caps proposed as solution to medical
malpractice insurance crisis); Appendix, Table I. Barely a decade after the mid-70's "crisis,"
which generated at least 11 statutes capping medical malpractice damages, state legislatures
found that yet another malpractice insurance "crisis" existed. See Farrell, Virginia's Medical
Malpractice Cap and the Doctrineof Substantive Due Process, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 684, 687-88
(1988)(cap concept resurrected when malpractice insurance crisis occurred again).
51. See Farrell, Virginia's Medical Malpractice Cap and the Doctrine of Substantive Due
Process, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 684, 687-88 (1988)(cap concept new solution to old problem of
skyrocketing medical malpractice insurance premiums); Appendix, Table I. The movement to
enact limits on damage awards spawned the tort "reform" movement, which caused state legislatures to revise common-law rules for personal injury causes of action. See Farrell, Virginia's
Medical Malpractice Cap and the Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 23 TORT & INS. L.J.
684, 698-99 (1988)(tort reform was American Medical Association's first priority in 1986); cf
Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and InsuranceImprovement Act - A Survey and Analysis of
its History, Construction and Constitutionality, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1984)(section
5.82 of Insurance Code meant to be replaced by more comprehensive tort reform). The tort
reform movement also has led to a whole new wave of damage limitations in 15 states. See
Farrell, Virginia's Medical Malpractice Cap and the Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 23
TORT & INS. L.J. 684, 688-89, table I (1988)(malpractice damage caps revived in 1987); Appendix, Table I. Twenty-seven states have capped medical malpractice liability to some extent.
See Appendix, Table II. The states that have limited liability are Alaska, California, Colorado,
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numerous, the statutes are distinguishable by virtue of what they cap: overall damages,5 2 non-economic damages,5 a economic damages,5 4 general damages," and punitive damages. 56 Six of these statutes apply to all civil
damages. " While eight states besides Texas have invalidated their malpractice damage caps,5" only Florida struck down its cap on open courts
grounds.5 9 Analogously, the Kansas Supreme Court nullified that state's

Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
id. A total of 14 state caps have been litigated on constitutional grounds. See Appendix, Table
I.
52. See Appendix, Table II.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Appendix, Tables I and II. General damages cover "loss of reputation, shame,
mortification and hurt feelings." See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 665 P.2d 655, 680
n.15 (Cal. 1985).
56. See Appendix, Table II.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789 (W.D. Va. 1986)(overall cap violates
federal and state right to trial by jury), on reh'g, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987); Smith v.
Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087-89 (Fla. 1987)($450,000 non-economic damages cap
invalidated on state open courts grounds); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347
N.E.2d 736, 743-44 (Ill. 1976)($500,000 overall damages cap held unconstitutional under
equal protection scrutiny); Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 263-64
(Kan. 1988)($250,000 non-economic and $1 million overall damage caps invalidated on due
process and right to jury trial grounds); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980)
($250,000 non-economic cap invalid under equal protection clause); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978)($300,000 economic cap cannot pass equal protection scrutiny); White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Mont. 1983)($300,000 economic damages cap unconstitutional according to equal protection guarantee); Duren v. Suburban Community
Hosp., 482 N.E.2d 1358, 1362-63 (Ohio Com. P1. 1985)($200,000 general damages cap violates
equal protection requirements).
59. See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987)(damages cap
violates Florida Constitution's open courts guarantee because right to remedy abolished without showing overpowering public necessity and alternative remedy). In addition to the open
courts inquiry, federal and state guarantees of equal protection, due process and the right to
trial by jury are the ammunition most commonly used against damage caps. See Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition, 757 P.2d at 258, 264 ($1,000,000 overall and $250,000 non-economic damages caps violate state right to jury trial and state right to due process); see also
Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1089 ($450,000 non-economic damages cap violates state open courts
guarantee). Contra Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 682-83 (Cal. 1985)
($250,000 non-economic damages cap violates neither federal equal protection nor federal due
process rights); Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 442-44, 447 ($200,000 overall damages cap consistent with federal and state equal protection guarantees, federal due process and state open
courts guarantee). Few courts perceive these statutes as eliminating fundamental rights or
discriminating against suspect classes. See Fein, 695 P.2d at 682 (damages limit bears rational
relationship under equal protection clause to legislative end); Johnson, 404 N.E.2d at 601
(damages limit rationally related to legislative objective); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136 (dam-
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damage cap using a substantive due process inquiry strikingly similar to the
open courts analysis.6" The Kansas court determined that the state constitution conferred due process rights on its citizens by the constitutional promise
of "remedy by due course of law."'" Using a test similar to that used by the
Texas Supreme Court,6 2 the Kansas court determined that the damage limit
was unconstitutional because it removed a medical malpractice victim's remedy without offering a reasonable substitute.6 3 The open courts guarantee
and substantive due process are among the wide variety of tools available to

ages cap arbitrarily imposed and therefore not rationally related to reasonable legislative end).
Thus, equal protection scrutiny usually occurs at the lowest level - that of the rational relationship test. See id. (damages cap arbitrary and not rationally related to reasonable legislative
end). This is particularly true when a court intends to uphold a damage limitation. See Johnson, 404 N.E.2d at 601 (damages limit rationally related to legislative objective). Another
reason the rational relationship test is preferred by courts intending to uphold damages limitations is because the test presumes the law to be constitutional. Prendergast,256 N.W.2d at 669
(statute believed valid); Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135 (statute presumed valid). This presumption is not only difficult to overcome, but it places the burden of proving the statute's unconstitutionality on the challenger. See Prendergast, 256 N.W.2d at 669 (burden of proof on
challenger). Several courts, however, have struck down damage caps by concentrating on the
arbitrariness of the legislature's action when using the rational relationship-with-a-bite test.
See Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 743 (right to remedy denied on arbitrary basis); Arneson, 270
N.W.2d at 135 (restricting recovery of seriously injured victims not rationally related to reducing medical malpractice insurance premiums). Three other courts have employed mid-level
and strict scrutiny to defeat the damage caps' constitutionality. See Duren, 482 N.E.2d at 1363
(legislative scheme must be substantially related to legitimate state purpose); White, 661 P.2d
at 1274-75 (right to sue for personal injuries is fundamental right meriting strict scrutiny);
Carson, 424 A.2d at 830-31 (right to remedy so important that damage cap must be fair and
substantially related to legitimate legislative purpose).
60. Compare Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 260-63 (Kan.
1988)(Kansas constitutional guarantee of remedy by due course of law requires that when
common-law remedy modified or abolished, must offer adequate substitute remedy and prove
real and substantial relation to legislative objective) with Lucas v. United States, 30 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 423, 426 (May 11, 1988)justiciable right to redress may not be abrogated on unreasonable or arbitrary basis without providing reasonable substitute remedy).
61. See Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition, 757 P.2d at 260. Article I,section 18 of
the Kansas Constitution guarantees that "[a]ll persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without
delay." KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 18. Using much the same language, the article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution promises that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done him, in his land, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law." TEX. CONST. art I, § 13.
62. Lucas v. United States, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 426 (May 11, 1988)(open courts
guarantee violated when litigant shows common-law right to remedy restricted for unreasonable and arbitrary purposes when compared to reasons for statute).
63. See Kansas Medical Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 259-60
(Kan. 1988)(health care savings for state citizens not reasonable alternative remedy for seriously injured victims).
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courts considering statutes that limit medical malpractice damages. 64 The
65
tool itself plays a great role in determining the outcome of the analysis.
In Lucas v. United States,66 the Texas Supreme Court used the open
courts guarantee to determine that the $500,000 cap on non-economic damages for medical malpractice was inconsistent with the Texas Constitution.6 7
The court recognized that the right to bring a personal injury lawsuit for
medical malpractice damages is a "well-defined common-law cause of action ' 68 protected by the right to redress specified in article I, section 13 of
the Texas Constitution. 69 The court gave the damage limitation a presumption of validity in its review,7 ° but held the statute violated the constitutional
right of redress by arbitrarily and unreasonably restricting access to the
courts. 7 Although the limit did not totally block access to the courts, 72 the
64. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789 (W.D. Va. 1986), reh'g denied, 672 F.
Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987)(blanket cap violates federal and state right to trial by jury); Smith
v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087-89 (Fla. 1987)(damage cap invalidated on state
open courts grounds); Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition, 757 P.2d at 263-64 (malpractice
cap invalidated on due process and right to jury trial grounds); Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 482 N.E.2d 1358, 1362-63 (Ohio Com. P1. 1985)(damage cap violates equal protection requirements); see also Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act - A Survey and Analysis of its History, Construction and Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR L.
REV. 265, 327-31 (1984)(Texas damage limit subject to equal protection and substantive due
process scrutiny); Witherspoon, Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting Liability for
Medical Malpractice, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 439-42, 452-56 (1979)(Texas damage limit
subject to invalidation on procedural due process, substantive due process and equal protection
grounds). Damage caps also have been struck down on equal protection, due process and open
courts grounds. See Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 594-600 (Ind. 1980)
($500,000 overall damages cap consistent with due process, equal protection and open courts
requirements); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094, 1109 (La. 1985)($500,000 overall damage cap meets equal protection scrutiny).
65. Compare Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition, 757 P.2d at 258, 264 (damage caps
abrogate due process by arbitrarily removing common-law right of redress and by not providing reasonable alternative remedy) with Sibley, 462 So. 2d at 157 (damage cap meets state and
federal procedural due process because rationally related to legitimate governmental end). Cf
Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical MalpracticeInsurance Crisis: ConstitutionalImplications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 769-70 (1977)(tier of equal protection test will determine law's
constitutionality).
66. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423 (May 11, 1988).
67. Id. at 424.
68. Id. at 426.
69. Id.
70. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 426 (May 11, 1985)(article 4590i
presumed valid). The court indicated it considered the damage limitations' constitutionality
"[w]ith all respect due a legislative enactment." Id. Traditionally, such respect translates into
a presumption of validity for the legislature's reasons behind the law. See Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 669 (Neb. 1977)(law presumed valid). This presumption, in turn, places
the burden of proving invalidity on the law's challenger. Id.
71. Lucas, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 426.
72. Id.
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court implied that the Texas Constitution's greater store of individual rights
necessitates the invalidation of laws that even partially obstruct an individual's right to a remedy. 7" The court determined that the legislature acted
arbitrarily when it decided to cap damages only for medical malpractice lawsuits 74 and unreasonably by not offering medical malpractice victims a suitable alternative means of redress.75
Justice Culver concurred in the result but emphasized that damage caps
76
can be constitutional if they also establish an alternative means of redress.
In fact, Justice Culver concluded that the Texas malpractice damage limit
would have been constitutional had an adequate quid pro quo existed. 7 Justice Culver based her conclusion on the majority's findings that damage limits in other states were declared valid when compensation funds existed and
that creation of a compensation fund had been recommended to the Texas

73. Id. The court also analogized the partial restriction of redress in Lucas to LeCroy v.

Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338-42 (Tex. 1986), which involved a lawsuit filing fee increase that
the court found invalid under article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. Id. at 427. The
court reasoned that because most of the fee increase proceeds did not go to the court system,
the increase partially obstructed the right of redress. See LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 338-42. The

Texas Constitution protects against the partial obstruction of rights because it gives individuals
greater rights than the United States Constitution. Id. at 338-39.
74. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 426 (May 11, 1988). The court
buttressed its conclusion that the legislature had acted arbitrarily by citing Wright v. Central
Du Page Hospital Association, which held that statutes limiting recovery are arbitrary when
only medical malpractice victims are affected. Id.; see also Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp.
Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976)(limitation of recovery arbitrary when applied only to
medical malpractice damages).
75. See Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 426. The Texas Supreme Court emphasized that
damage caps in other states had been upheld when the statutory limitation also included the
creation of an alternative remedy. Id.; see also Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d
585, 601 (Ind. 1980)(damage cap upheld because legislature created compensation fund); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149, 156 (La. 1985)(damage cap incorporating alternative remedy modeled on Indiana's upheld). Although the Texas legislature projected that the
damage limit would benefit society, the court reasoned that the effect was too general to pose
an adequate alternative remedy for the injured victim. Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 426. The
court also noted that the legislature had decided against providing a more specific alternative
remedy, even though the Texas Medical Professional Liability Study Commission had proposed establishing a medical malpractice victim's compensation fund. Id. Weighing the cap
against the legislature's reasons for enacting it, the court further determined that the cap was
unreasonable and arbitrary because the legislature itself had been uncertain that a damages cap
would reduce insurance rates and because the legislature's goal of relating actual damages to
the amounts awarded was more properly within the judiciary's province. Id. at 426-27.
76. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 466, 466 (May 25, 1988)(Culver, J.,
concurring). Justice Culver suggested that the requirements of an adequate alternative remedy
would be met if the legislature created a compensation fund for those who sustained catastrophic injuries. Id.
77. See id. The majority opinion lists the lack of a substitute remedy as but one of several
problems with the statute. Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 426 (May 11, 1988).
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Legislature.7
Justice Gonzalez dissented from the majority's inquiry into the nature of
the legislature's action,79 suggesting that the proper test was whether the

damage limit was reasonably related to a legitimate legislative purpose.80
Because he contended the legislature's purpose was legitimate, Justice Gonzalez would have held the limit valid under the equal protection,8" due process,82 and open courts8 3 provisions of the Texas Constitution.8 4 Because of
the presumptive validity accorded legislative acts,8" Justice Gonzalez applied
the rational basis test and argued that the damage limit should be valid on
equal protection grounds.8 6 Justice Gonzalez also criticized the majority for
not first giving the legislature the proper presumption of validity and erroneously beginning its inquiry into the reasonableness of the legislature's action.87 Justice Gonzalez held that the damage limit met the due process

clause's reasonable relation test because the legislature's purpose in fixing the
limit was proper.8 8 Finally, in addressing the statute's challenge under the
open courts guarantee, Justice Gonzalez agreed with the majority's standard
of review, 9 but objected to the court's conclusion that a reasonable quid pro
78. See Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 466 (patient compensation funds concurrently established with damage limits in two states). Justice Culver stated she shared the majority's "concern" that the damages limit was unreasonable and arbitrary when weighed against the
purposes for creating the statute, but did not specifically endorse this conclusion. Id.
79. Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 428 (May 11, 1988)(Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 429-30 (damage limit accords with rational relationship test); see also TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 3 (Texas equal protection clause).
82. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 430 (May 11, 1988)(Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting) (damage cap bears reasonable relation to proper legislative purpose); see also TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 19 (Texas due process clause).
83. See Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 430-31 (legislative reason for damage cap outweighs
restricted right of redress); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 (Texas open courts guarantee).
84. See Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 428 (damage cap accords with Texas equal protection and due process guarantees).
85. See id. at 429 (legislative acts presumed valid).
86. Id. at 430. Justice Gonzalez would have found article 4590i valid under the rational
relationship test. Id.; see also Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985)(law
must be rationally related to legitimate state purpose to meet equal protection requirements).
87. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 430 (May 11, 1988)(Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting) (rational basis test asks whether legislature's decision rational, not whether law will
meet legislative goal). Justice Gonzalez indicated that the majority incorrectly assumed the
role of a "super-legislature" when it failed to defer to the legislature's reasons for approving
the non-economic damage cap. Id.; see also New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04
(1975)judiciary may not act as super-legislature over reasonableness of legislative policy decisions). Justice Gonzalez suggested that the reasonableness inquiry improperly rested on case
law from out-of-state courts. Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 432.
88. Lucas, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 430.
89. Id. at 430-31. Justice Gonzalez agreed that the standard for reviewing article 4590i
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quo would have to exist before a damage limit could be valid. 9 Justice Gonzalez contended that the Texas Supreme Court never before had expressly
required an individual quid pro quo when a plaintiff's right to a jury trial
was partially limited. 9'
Chief Justice Phillips also dissented in an opinion that concurred with
Justice Gonzalez's dissent in all but the latter's method of open courts analysis. 92 Chief Justice Phillips asserted that the court first should have decided
whether a reasonable alternative remedy existed when the legislature created
the damage cap 93 and then should have weighed whether the limit bore a
reasonable relationship to the legislature's goal of eliminating a societal
evil. 94 Because Chief Justice Phillips would have found the damage limit
constitutional, he addressed the second certified question and stated that he
would have found that the damage cap limited each defendant's liability and
not each claimant's recovery. 9

The majority in Lucas9 6 correctly followed more than 130 years of Texas
Supreme Court decisions construing the open courts guarantee as barring
even partial foreclosure of the right to redress in striking down the legislature's $500,000 limitation on non-economic medical malpractice damages. 97
By deciding Lucas solely on open courts grounds, the court
under the open courts guarantee involved questioning whether the legislature had unreasonable or arbitrary objectives in approving a statute that restricted a cause of action found in the
common law. Id.
90. Id. at 430.
91. Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 430-31 (May 11, 1988).
92. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 666, 666-76 (Sept. 21, 1988)(Phillips,
C.J., dissenting) (cap constitutional under Texas constitutional guarantees of equal protection,
open courts, right to trial by jury, due course of law and prohibition against special laws).
93. Id. at 677-78.
94. Id. at 678. Addressing the first prong of the test, Chief Justice Phillips stated he
would have found that the legislature did not provide a reasonable quid pro quo when it created the damage cap. Id. at 679. In fact, Chief Justice Phillips found it apparent that the
damage limit could not adequately compensate severely injured plaintiffs such as Christopher
Lucas. However, Chief Justice Phillips would have found the limit constitutional under the
second prong of his open courts analysis. Chief Justice Phillips reasoned that because a legislative committee had found a causal relationship between medical malpractice damage awards
and the malpractice insurance "crisis," the damage limit was rationally related to the legislative purpose of ending the "crisis." Id. at 679-80.
95. Id. at 680.
96. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 426 (May 11, 1988).
97. See O'Shea v. Twohig, 9 Tex. 336, 341-42 (1852)(seminal decision holding each citi-
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remained consistent with its history of protecting the additional rights given
Texas citizens by the state constitution.9 8 The court's apparent unwilzen has right of access to court); see also LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 343 (Tex. 1986)
(law raising district court filing fees without funding judicial system with proceeds violates
open courts guarantee by interfering with citizen's right to redress); Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 196, 275 S.W.2d 951, 953 (1955)open courts guarantee prohibits unreasonable partial restriction on right to redress); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 212, 48
S.W.2d 944, 947 (1932)(city ordinance requiring notice of defect before citizen can sue for
injuries arising from defect violates open courts provision by blocking right to redress).
O'Shea v. Twohig marked the first time the Texas Supreme Court had enforced the open courts
guarantee. See LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 340 (O'Shea was Texas' first open courts case). The
case involved a citizen who sought to sue several defendants, but could not because the county
with proper jurisdiction had no courts. O'Shea, 9 Tex. at 341-42. Reasoning that this condition abrogated the plaintiff's ability to sue in the proper court, the Texas Supreme Court held
that the constitutional right to redress would enable the plaintiff to sue in the county where the
defendants had last resided. Id. While O'Shea confirmed the right to redress in the face of a
total blockage of court access, the Texas Supreme Court soon applied the protection of the
open courts guarantee when redress was only partially blocked. See Teas v. Robinson, 11 Tex.
774, 777 (1854)(right to appeal may not be denied because of defective statute); see also Eustis
v. City of Henrietta, 90 Tex. 468, 473-74, 39 S.W. 567, 569 (1897)(statute requiring payment of
property taxes prior to making defense to tax sale violates right to redress); Dillingham v.
Putnam, 109 Tex. 1, 4, 14 S.W. 303, 304 (1890)(right to appeal not contingent on ability to put
up bond); Lumpkin v. Muncey, 66 Tex. 311, 313, 17 S.W. 732, 733 (1886)(open courts guarantee gives citizens of newly organized county benefits of courts even when courts do not exist in
new county).
98. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983)(additional rights provided by
open courts provision does not require court's decision to incorporate Texas or federal equal
protection clause); see also Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1108 (N.D. Tex. 1986)
(open courts guarantee exceeds rights given in federal due process clause by using less strict
test for deciding law's validity); LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. 1986)(enforcing
additional rights in Texas Constitution strengthens federalism); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d
918, 923 (Tex. 1984)(Texas Supreme Court required to protect additional rights guaranteed by
state constitution). Conversely, the Texas equal protection clause provides no rights in addition to those provided by its federal counterpart. See 1 G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

13-14 (1977)(Texas

equal protection clause does not provide greater protection than federal equal protection
clause). Since the open courts guarantee is not found in the United States Constitution, the
court's action in deciding cases solely on open courts grounds affirms the guarantee's validity
and power. See LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 338, 340-41 (Texas Supreme Court in mainstream of
movement to protect state-given rights such as the open courts guarantee). Because Texas'
open courts guarantee also bears strong resemblance to substantive due process, the court's
decision to base the Lucas holding solely on the open courts provision is consistent with the
United States Supreme Court's use of substantive due process to strike down economic regulations in the early 1900's. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 11.4 at 352 (3rd ed. 1986)(no need to address equal protection issues once violation of substantive due process determined). The damages cap bears strong resemblance to an economic
regulation since one of its primary purposes was to cause medical malpractice insurance rates
to decrease. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 11.02(b)(1),(2),(5),(6) (Vernon Supp. 1988)
(legislature's purpose to reduce cost and number of malpractice claims so that insurance premiums would drop); see also Farrell, Virginia's Medical Malpractice Cap and the Doctrine of
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lingness to presume the constitutionality of the statute to the exclusion of the
arbitrariness and unreasonableness inquiries also is consistent with Texas
open courts precedent.99 Further, the court did not break new ground
Substantive Due Process, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 684, 702 (1988)(damage caps an economic
regulation). While substantive due process as an economic regulator is largely discredited on
the federal level, many states have not renounced it. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4 at 352 (3rd ed. 1986)(United States Supreme Court no
longer uses substantive due process to strike down government economic regulations); B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (1980)(states still employ substantive
due process); see also Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132 (N.D. 1978)(North Dakota
never has renounced substantive due process). In Texas, the state supreme court continues to
subject economic regulations to the substantive due process-like open courts test. See Neagle
v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11, 11-12 (Tex. 1985)(desire to decrease medical malpractice insurance
rates unreasonable goal of statute abolishing discovery rule); Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 921-23
(reducing medical malpractice insurance rates not rationally related to elimination of discovery rule in medical malpractice cases); Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 667 (reducing medical malpractice
insurance rates unreasonable objective of law preventing tolling of statute of limitations for
minors); see also Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and InsuranceImprovement Act - A Survey and Analysis of its History, Construction and Constitutionality, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265,
326 (1984)(Texas Supreme Court used substantive due process test in Sax v. Votteler); cf. B.
SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 16 (1980)(substantive due process a
valuable United States Supreme Court doctrine). Substantive due process also applies when a
statute results in a "taking," which can include the removal of a common-law right. See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 133-34 (substantive due process review prompted when legislature uses
police power to remove right); Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and InsuranceImprovement
Act - A Survey and Analysis of its History, Construction and Constitutionality, 36 BAYLOR L.
REV. 265, 327 (1984)(taking triggers substantive due process review). Since the right to redress is a common-law right that is blocked when a damages cap does not provide an alternative means of redress, Texas' damage limit could be considered a taking. See Keith, The Texas
Medical Liability and InsuranceImprovement Act - A Survey and Analysis of its History, Construction and Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 328 (1984)(Texas damage cap categorized as taking because it provides no reasonable substitute remedy); see also Witherspoon,
Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting Liability for Medical Malpractice, 10 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 419, 452-53 (1979)(Texas's damage cap violates substantive due process by
invidiously discriminating against seriously injured in favor of health care providers). Because
the Texas damage limit could be considered a taking, substantive due process review would
apply. See Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and InsuranceImprovement Act - A Survey and
Analysis of its History, Construction and Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 328 (1984)
(Texas' medical malpractice damages limit violates substantive due process); Witherspoon,
Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting Liability for Medical Malpractice, 10 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 419, 452-53 (1979)(invidious discrimination and failure to provide reasonable
substitute marks Texas damages limit violative of substantive due process).
99. See, e.g., Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984)(when constitutional
right affected by unreasonable legislative condition court has no duty to defer to it); Sax v.
Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Tex. 1983)(despite presumption of validity statute not immune from scrutiny of underlying purposes when right to redress abrogated); Waites v.
Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. 1977)(legislature cannot arbitrarily or unreasonably withdraw right to remedy); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 210, 48 S.W.2d 944, 949
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(1932)(ordinance not given presumption of validity when determined unreasonable for denying
justice); see also Keith, The Texas MedicalLiability and InsuranceImprovement Act - A Survey
and Analysis of its History, Construction & Constitutionality, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 329
(1984)(right to redress should be shielded from arbitrary and unreasonable legislative action);
Taylor & Shields, The Limitation on Recovery in Medical Negligence Cases in Virginia, 16 U.
RICH. L. REV. 799, 844 (1987)(presumption of validity in rational relationship test does not
prevent court from scrutinizing statute for constitutionality); cf Farrell, Virginia's Medical
Malpractice Cap and the Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 684, 702
(1988)(problem with deferring to legislature is vulnerability to intense political pressure from
health care lobbying groups). While the Texas Supreme Court has a record of presuming the
validity of legislative enactments under equal protection and open courts review, the court in
recent years has seemed to give the presumption short shrift when faced with a statute it deems
unusually arbitrary or capricious. Compare Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. 1968)
(statute presumed valid and difference of opinion by court insufficient to rule statute arbitrary
or unreasonable) with Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 664 (despite presumption, court may inquire into
reasonableness of statutes that deny right of redress). Only recently has the court sharpened
the reasons for giving the presumption of constitutionality little weight. See Nelson, 678
S.W.2d at 926 (Robertson, J., concurring) (tradition of giving wide deference to legislature has
limits when constitutional right affected); Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 665-66 (legislative action scrutinized when justiciable right of redress abrogated); see also Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11, 12
(Tex. 1985)(adopting reasoning of Nelson and Sax in holding section 10.01 of article 4590i
unconstitutional). The Texas Supreme Court's erosion of deference for particular legislative
enactments is similar to the lack of deference the United States Supreme Court displayed in the
early 1900's, when the Court struck down economic regulations using substantive due process.
See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4 at 352 (3rd ed.
1986)(economic laws upheld only if court majority believed means used were reasonable).
Commentators criticize the federal substantive due process era as one in which the Court
exercised personal prejudice by improperly examining the reasons behind and goals of

economic laws. See id. But see B.

SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION

22-23 (1980)(substantive due process has solid constitutional basis). The primary criticism of
substantive due process is that inquiries into the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of legislative action elevate the courts into super-legislatures that know no bounds. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-13 (1965)(Black, J., dissenting) (substantive due process evaluation depends on justices' own value judgments and transforms court into super-legislature); J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.4 at 352 (3rd ed. 1986)
(substantive due process gave United States Supreme Court great discretion). Conversely, the
Texas Supreme Court appears long ago to have established the boundaries of the substantive
due process inquiry through its consideration of the constitutionality of the state's worker's
compensation law. See Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 108-10, 185 S.W.
556, 561 (1916)(worker's compensation law neither arbitrary nor unreasonable). Applying the
standard open courts test, the Middleton court held that the worker's compensation law was
not unreasonable because the legislature had given injured employees guaranteed compensation for injuries incurred on the job in exchange for the removal of the employee's commonlaw right to sue the employer for negligence. See id. at 560. The court also found the law was
not arbitrary because the legislature had found that a statutory response was demanded for the
problem of employees who were injured on the job. See id. at 561 (legislature had known
problem of compensating injured workers); cf Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347
N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976)(court's use of constitutional worker's compensation law illustrated
why damages cap was unconstitutional under equal protection scrutiny). The
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by using open courts analysis to hold that the right to redress could only
have been replaced by a quid pro quo that specifically accommodates malpractice victims."ic Therefore, the court used the proper standard for

arbitrariness and unreasonableness standards as articulated in Middleton seem to have been
applied to the Texas medical malpractice damage limit. Compare Lucas v. United States, 31
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 426 (May 11, 1988)(damages limit unreasonable for not providing specific
quid pro quo and arbitrary because legislature not certain cap would decrease malpractice
insurance rates) with Middleton, 185 S.W. at 560-61 (worker's compensation law not unreasonable because adequate substitute remedy provided and not arbitrary because legislative action
based on known problem with employee negligence lawsuits). If doubt remains as to the
boundaries of the arbitrary and unreasonable prongs of the open courts test used by the Texas
Supreme Court, the matter may be clarified when the court considers an action challenging the
legislature's abolition of the common-law cause of action for the alienation of affection. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988)(abolishing cause of action for alienation
of affection). Alienation of affection actions in Texas have been founded on the loss of a
spouse's consortium and are proved by showing that the "other" woman or man intentionally
breached a duty not to intrude on a marriage and that the interloper caused damages. See
Smith v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 1001, 1006 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, no writ)(when
spouse's affections intentionally or purposefully alienated, action for loss of consortium lies);
Collier v. Perry, 149 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1949, writ dism'd)(alienation
of affection actions lie for loss of consortium when intentional breach of duty and damages).
100. See, e.g., LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex. 1986)(quid pro quo for
removed right reasonable only if it affects individual); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667
(Tex. 1983)(when removing means of redress legislature must provide reasonable substitute);
Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 199, 275 S.W.2d 951, 954-55 (1955)(substitute
remedy must accompany legislature's elimination of common-law remedy); Middleton v.
Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 109-10, 185 S.W. 556, 560-61 (1916)(legislature's abolition of employees' action of negligence against employers not unreasonable when guaranteed
compensation substituted); see also Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice
InsuranceCrisis: ConstitutionalImplications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 789-91 (1977)(courts more
likely to uphold damages caps when quid pro quo tangible, not general). The Texas Supreme
Court's requirement of a specific quid pro quo is consistent with decisions by supreme courts in
other states. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987)(abrogation of right to remedy reasonable only if specific quid pro quo exists); Wright v. Central Du
Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ill. 1976)(requiring specific quid pro quo where right
to redress removed); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837-38 (N.H. 1980)(societal quid pro
quo insufficient to pose reasonable substitute). But see Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
695 P.2d 665, 681-82 n.18 (Cal. 1985)(general quid pro quo of seeking healthy insurance industry is sufficient); cf Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 134-35 (N.D. 1978)(North Dakota
does not require quid pro quo every time legislature removes common-law right); Strykowski
v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434, 447-48 (Wisc. 1978)(Wisconsin does not require quid pro quo
when common-law right abrogated). One commentator has suggested that the question facing
legislatures that change common-law rights is whether the quid pro quo must pose "duplicate
recovery at common law or a reasonable substitute." Farrell, Virginia's Medical Malpractice
Cap and the Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 684, 691 (1988). The
United States Supreme Court has never answered this question, though it raised it in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina EnvironmentalStudy Group. See id.; see also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978)(questioning whether quid pro quo
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reviewing the medical malpractice damage cap, while insisting on a reasonable substitute remedy for those whose redress the cap partially removed 101
The majority's determination that the legislature was unreasonable for not

providing a specific substitute remedy"0 2 leads to the possibility that the legislature would be encouraged to include a quid pro quo when devising another damage cap. 113 However, the Texas Supreme Court historically has

should be provided for nuclear accident victims in return for federal law limiting nuclear
power plants' liability). In Texas, however, the courts clearly have mandated that reasonable
substitutes must be made available when common-law rights of redress are restricted, either in
whole or in part. See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 667 (unreasonable to expect third party to seek
redress on behalf of individual whose rights have been statutorily eliminated); Lebohm, 154
Tex. at 199, 275 S.W.2d at 954-55 (reasonable substitute must follow legislative abolition of
common-law remedy). The Texas Supreme Court views a reasonable substitute as approximating the right of redress removed by the legislature. See LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 342 (individual quid pro quo required when individual right removed). Judicial support for reasonable
substitutes, Farrell states, could lead to the creation of damages caps with quid pro quos comparable to the compensation funds created by worker's compensation statutes. See Farrell,
Virginia's Medical Malpractice Cap and the Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 23 TORT &
INS. L.J. 684, 693 (1988)(support of reasonable substitute leads to creation of workman's compensation-like funds). This seems likely in Texas given that the Texas Supreme Court first
supported the concept of a reasonable substitute remedy when deciding the constitutionality of
the state's worker's compensation statute. See Middleton, 108 Tex. at 108, 185 S.W. at 560 (by
substituting guaranteed compensation, legislature constitutionally abolished employees' common-law cause of action against employer for negligence).
101. See, e.g., LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex. 1986)(right of redress cannot
be unreasonably abridged for society's general benefit); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923
(Tex. 1984)(when constitutional right affected by unreasonable legislative condition court has
duty not to defer to it); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665-67 (Tex. 1983)(statute cannot be
unreasonable nor arbitrary nor fail to provide reasonable substitute means of redress). See
generally Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and InsuranceImprovement Act - A Survey and
Analysis of its History, Construction & Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 329 (right to
redress sufficiently important to be shielded from arbitrary and unreasonable legislative
action).
102. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 426 (May 11, 1988)(damage cap
unreasonable when alternative remedy not provided); see also id. at 466 (Culver, J., concurring) (specifically stating damage limits would survive constitutional scrutiny if adequate substitute tendered). Justice Culver specifically used the example of a patient compensation fund
as an adequate substitute. See id.
103. See MalpracticeCap Held to Be Invalid, The Tex. Lawyer, May 16, 1988, at 12, col.
3 (quoting State Rep. Brad Wright, R-Houston, who said Lucas decision may encourage legislature to establish victim compensation fund as quid pro quo). A minority report of the Texas
Medical Professional Liability Study Commission encouraged the 1977 legislature to enact a
patients' compensation fund along with the limit on non-medical damages. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY STUDY COMMISSION TO THE 65TH

TEXAS LEGISLATURE 50-62 (December 1976)(available at Texas Legislative Reference Library
in Austin) (minority report by W. Page Keeton proposing patients' compensation fund). As
proposed by Keeton, the Texas fund would have required doctors to obtain malpractice insurance for a certain monetary amount of liability and to annually contribute a percentage of the
premium to the fund. Id. When judgments exceeded the amount of the doctor's insurance, the
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required that statutes be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable to withstand
open courts scrutiny."o The court traditionally has considered the arbitrary
and unreasonableness standards separate requirements that must be met and
supported independently. °5 Due to the court's finding that the legislature
acted arbitrarily in limiting only medical malpractice damages,' °6 a future
damage limit that included a quid pro quo still could be required not to be
arbitrary under traditional open courts review. 07
fund would have paid the uncovered amount of the claim up to a set limit. Patients' compensation funds benefit doctors by providing an additional layer of insurance, assuring that state
malpractice insurance premiums reflect the state's experience in paying claims from the fund,
and by easing the difficulty of pricing malpractice insurance. Id.; see also Comment, Patients'
Compensation Fund and the Bad Faith Cause of Action: Two Proposed Amendments to the
Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1603, 1612-13 (1986)(funds created to address insurance aspect of medical malpractice crisis).
Some courts view patient compensation funds as fulfilling the requirement of providing a specific quid pro quo in exchange for the abrogation of the right to redress through malpractice
damage limits. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1089 (Fla. 1987)
(legislature must provide specific quid pro quo that relates to abrogated right to remedy);
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 601 (Ind. 1975)(availability of patient
compensation fund fulfills requirement for quid pro quo, thus damage limit constitutional);
Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 669 (Neb. 1977)(voluntary compensation fund fulfills
quid pro quo requirement).
104. See, e.g., LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 341 (Tex. 1986)(substantive right of
open courts cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably abrogated); Lebohm v. City of Galveston,
154 Tex. 192, 199, 275 S.W.2d 951, 955 (1955)(removal of common-law remedy cannot be
arbitrary and unreasonable); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 212, 48 S.W.2d 944,
948 (1932)(when cause of action withdrawn, due process denied if action arbitrary and unreasonable). See generally Taylor & Shields, The Limitation on Recovery in Medical Negligence
Cases in Virginia, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 799, 847 (1982)(legislation capping medical malpractice damages cannot be arbitrary nor unreasonable if it is to meet substantive due process
requirements).
105, See, e.g., Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. 1985)(Robertson, J., concurring) (statute can be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable to meet open courts requirements);
Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984)(unreasonable condition imposed arbitrarily by legislature violates open courts guarantee); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665-66
(Tex. 1983)(statute cannot arbitrarily or unreasonably abridge right of redress); Waites v.
Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. 1977)(legislature cannot arbitrarily or unreasonably withdraw right to remedy).
106. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 426 (May 11, 1988)(damage
limit arbitrary when only medical malpractice victims affected); see also Taylor & Shields, The
Limitation on Recovery in Medical Negligence Cases in Virginia, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 799, 84647 (1982)(commentators believe any medical malpractice damages limit chosen by legislature
necessarily is arbitrary). Contra Redish, Legislative Response to the MedicalMalpracticeInsurance Crisis: ConstitutionalImplications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 784 (1977)(broad discretion of
substantive due process review makes it unlikely legislature will be found to be arbitrary in
determining damages limit); cf Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)(Supreme
Court need not accept legislative purpose without investigation when review shows claimed
purpose not legislature's goal).
107. See LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 342 (Tex. 1986)(lawmakers forbidden to
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CASENOTE

Appropriately, the court did not consider whether the damage limit violated the Texas Constitution's equal protection guarantee.108 Had the court
utilized an equal protection analysis, the damage limit would not likely have
survived.' °9 Due to the purposes for enacting the legislation," ° the cap

arbitrarily or unreasonably impede right of access guaranteed by open courts provision);
Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 199, 275 S.W.2d 951, 955 (1955)(removal of
common-law remedy allowed only when not arbitrary and unreasonable, and when reasonable
remedy substituted); Keith, The Texas Medical MalpracticeLiability and InsuranceImprovement Act - A Survey and Analysis of its History, Construction and Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR
L. REV. 265, 328-29 (1984)(right to redress deserves protection from arbitrary takings); Taylor
& Shields, The Limitation on Recovery in Medical Negligence Cases in Virginia, 16 U. RICH. L.
REV. 799, 847 (1982)(legislation capping medical malpractice damages cannot be arbitrary to
meet substantive due process requirements).
108. Compare Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 424 (May 11, 1988)(damages limit unconstitutional under open courts analysis) with Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d
414, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1986)(damages limit reviewed and found constitutional under both federal due process and equal protection standards). See also Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp.
1102, 1108 (N.D. Tex. 1986)(open courts guarantee exceeds federal due process clause in protections by using less strict test for deciding law's validity); LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 339 (enforcing additional rights in Texas Constitution strengthens federalism); Nelson v. Krusen, 678
S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984)(Texas Supreme Court required to protect additional rights guaranteed by state constitution); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983)(additional
rights provided by open courts provision does not necessitate further review under Texas or
federal equal protection clause).
109. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976)
($500,000 overall damage cap violates rational relationship test); White v. State, 661 P.2d
1271, 1274-75 (Mont. 1983)($300,000 economic damage cap fails equal protection test by abrogating fundamental right to sue for personal injuries); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 831-35
(N.H. 1980)($250,000 non-economic damage cap fails to pass substantial relationship test);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978)($300,000 economic damage limit violates equal protection by being unreasonable and arbitrary); Duren v. Suburban Community
Hosp., 482 N.E.2d 1358, 1363 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1985)(court applies equal protection analysis
and holds $200,000 general damage cap violates substantial relation test); see also Keith, The
Texas Medical Liability and InsuranceImprovement Act - A Survey of its History, Construction
and Constitutionality,36 BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 327 (1984)(damage limit violates equal protection clause); Witherspoon, Constitutionalityof the Texas Statute Limiting Liabilityfor Medical
Malpractice, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 453 (1979)(damage cap violates equal protection
clause under rational relationship test); Comment, Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas: The New Legislative Procedurefor Amputation of Patients' Rights, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 481, 507 (1981)(damage limit subject to equal protection attack). Contra Redish,
Legislative Response to the Medical MalpracticeInsurance Crisis: ConstitutionalImplications,
55 TEX. L. REV. 759, 771 (1977)(damage limits should survive equal protection scrutiny on
either rational relationship or strict scrutiny levels).
110. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02(b)(1),(2),(5),(6) (Vernon Supp.
1988); see also FINAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY STUDY
COMMISSION TO THE 65TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE 3-8 (December 1976)(available in Texas
Legislative Reference Library) (purposes of law to reduce spiraling medical malpractice insurance rates).
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could be classified as an economic regulation."' As an economic regulation,
the measure likely would have been tested by the court on an intermediate
112
level that emphasized the legislature's purposes in enacting the statute.

Because the court already has determined through its open courts review
that the legislature was arbitrary and unreasonable in enacting the damage

equal proteccap, 113 the court may arrive at the same conclusions under an
14
future.'
the
in
limit
damage
the
invalidate
and
tion analysis
111. See Farrell, Virginia's Medical MalpracticeCap and the Doctrine of Substantive Due
Process, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 684, 702 (1988)(damage caps classified as economic regulation).
The damages cap bears strong resemblance to an economic regulation since one of its primary
purposes was to cause medical malpractice insurance rates to decrease. Id.
112. See Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1985)(court struck down tax because
did not promote legitimate state purpose); Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex.
1985)(unreasonableness signalled when legislative classification overinclusive); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881-82 (1985)(court may inquire into reasons
behind legislative classification). Texas may have been ahead of the United States Supreme
Court in "putting teeth" into the rational relationship test, particularly regarding economic
regulation. Compare Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881-82 (among first economic cases to which Court
applied its bite) with Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. City of Dallas, 98 Tex. 396, 416, 84 S.W. 648,
654 (1905)(employing the rational relationship with "bite" test). As long ago as 1905, the
Texas Supreme Court emphasized whether a regulation's interference with the economic system was "unwarranted or arbitrary." See Houston & T.C. Ry. Co., 84 S.W. at 654 (economic
regulation cannot be arbitrarily imposed); 1 BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 17-18 (1977)(Texas rational relationship inquiry has long had "bite" when economics cases reviewed); see also San Antonio Retail
Grocers v. Lafferty, 156 Tex. 574, 579, 297 S.W.2d 813, 817 (1957)(law prohibiting groceries
from offering under-priced merchandise posed arbitrary and unreasonable classification);
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. City of Georgetown, 428 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1968, no writ)(ordinance regulating gasoline tank truck size subject to review for arbitrariness and unreasonableness). Joseph Witherspoon advocates the use of strict scrutiny
rather than the rational relationship test when reviewing damage limits under equal protection.
See Witherspoon, Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting Liability for Medical Malpractice, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 462 (1979)(strict scrutiny merited by damage limit's
denial of fundamental rights and invidious discrimination). According to Witherspoon, damage limits deny fundamental rights by partially abrogating the right to have a jury decide
damages. See id. at 458. Invidious discrimination occurs because damage limits pose a statutory preference for the health care industry over seriously injured medical malpractice victims.
See id. at 453. Some states have used heightened levels of equal protection scrutiny to strike
down damage limits. See, e.g., White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272, 1274-75 (Mont. 1983)(strict
scrutiny required when plaintiff's fundamental right to bring action for personal injuries abrogated); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980)(right to remedy requires showing
that statute fair and substantially related to legitimate legislative objective); Duren v. Suburban
Community Hosp., 482 N.E.2d 1358, 1363 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1985)(court adopts Carson holding
that substantial relationship test merited by importance of right to remedy).
113. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 427 (May 11, 1988)(legislature
arbitrary and unreasonable in imposing damage cap).
114. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976)
($500,000 overall damages cap violates rational relationship test); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978)($300,000 economic damages limit violates equal protection
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By guaranteeing the right to a remedy, the open courts provision in the
Texas Constitution gives Texas citizens rights not found in the United States
Constitution. The Texas Supreme Court correctly protected these added
rights by using the open courts provision to invalidate Texas' $500,000 limit
on medical malpractice damages. The court's application of the open courts
principle was consistent with precedent and mirrored substantive due process review, which views the guarantee as a source of substantive due process
requiring the legislature to fashion a reasonable substitute when restricting a
common-law remedy. This broad interpretation enabled the court to strike
down the damage cap without using the Texas equal protection clause. Yet,
the court may use the equal protection analysis to strike down future legislation that resurrects the damage limit and includes a substitute remedy.

Kathryn Kase

by being unreasonable and arbitrary); Keith, The Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act - A Survey and Analysis of its History, Construction and Constitutionality, 36
BAYLOR L. REV. 265, 327 (1984)(limitation on damages violates equal protection clause);
Witherspoon, Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting Liabilityfor MedicalMalpractice,
10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 453 (1979)(damages cap violates equal protection clause under
rational relationship test); Comment, Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of
Texas: The New Legislative Procedurefor Amputation of Patients' Rights, 30 BAYLOR L. REV.
481, 507 (1978)(damages limitation subject to equal protection attack). In evaluating the legislative purposes of a damages cap under the equal protection clause, other courts have inquired
into whether the cap provides a specific quid pro quo in return for the creation of a discriminatory classification. See Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 742 (societal quid pro quo insufficient to fulfill
equal protection requirement of reasonableness); Carson, 424 A.2d at 837-39 (damage cap's
lack of specific reasonable substitute violates equal protection). Thus, it is possible that question of a quid pro quo also would have arisen had the Texas Supreme Court evaluated the noneconomic damages limit according to equal protection. See Witherspoon, Constitutionality of
the Texas Statute Limiting Liabilityfor MedicalMalpractice, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 46263 (1979)(quid pro quo could be required by Texas Supreme Court when evaluating damages
limitation). The court's open courts analysis in Lucas demonstrates that the absence of a quid
pro quo when common-law rights are abrogated is considered evidence of the statute's unreasonableness. See Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423, 426-27 (May 11, 1988)(lack
of specific quid pro quo makes damage limit unreasonable when weighed against statutory
purposes).
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APPENDIX
Table I
States That Have Enacted Damage Limitationsfor Medical Malpractice
STATE

ENACTED

Alaska

1986

$500,000 non-economic,
all civil actions

California

1975

$250,000 non-economic

Colorado

1986

$250,000 non-economic,
all civil actions

Florida

1986

$450,000 non-economic
all civil actions

Idaho

1975

$300,000 overall

Illinois

1975

$500,000 overall

Wright v. CentralDu Page Hosp.
Ass'n., 347 N.E.2d 736 (I1. 1976)
(cap violates equal protection clause
in Illinois Constitution).

Indiana

1975

$500,000 overall

Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp. Inc.,
404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980)(cap
consistent with Indiana open courts
doctrine, state and federal due
process and federal equal protection
guarantees).

Kansas

1986
1986

$250,000 non-economic
$1 million overall

Kansas Malpractice Victims
Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251
(Kan. 1988)(caps violate Kansas
constitutional rights to trial by jury
and due process).

Louisiana

1975

$500,000 overall

Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462
So. 2d 149 (La. 1985), on reh'g, 477
So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985)(cap meets
equal protection, due process and
open courts requirements).

1986

$350,000 non-economic,

Maryland

TYPE OF LIMIT

CHALLENGES

Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985)(cap does
not violate federal equal protection
or due process).

Smith v. Dept. of Ins, 507 So. 2d
1080 (Fla. 1987)(cap
unconstitutional for violating state
open courts guarantee).

all civil actions
Massachusetts

1986

$500,000 non-economic

Michigan

1986

$225,000 non-economic

Minnesota

1986

$400,000 non-economic,
all civil actions

Missouri

1986

$375,000 non-economic

Montana

1977

$300,000 economic

White v. State, 661 P.2d 1271
(Mont. 1983)(cap violates state
equal protection guarantee).

(Continued)
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APPENDIX

Table I (continued)
States That Have Enacted Damage Limitationsfor Medical Malpractice
TYPE OF LIMIT

CHALLENGES

Nebraska

1976

$500,000 overall

Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d
657 (Neb. 1977)(cap meets state due
process and equal protection
requirements).

New Hampshire

1979

$250,000 non-economic

Carson v. Maurer,424 A.2d 825
(N.H. 1980)(cap violates state and
federal equal protection guarantees).

1986

$875,000 non-economic,
applies to all civil
actions

New Mexico

1976

$50,000 non-economic

North Dakota

1977

$300,000 economic

Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
(N.D. 1978)(cap violates state equal
protection clause).

Ohio

1976

$200,000 general
damages

Duren v. Suburban Community
Hospital, 482 N.E.2d 1358 (Ohio
Com. Pl. 1985)(cap violates state
and federal equal protection
clauses).

STATE

ENACTED

South Dakota

1986

$1 million overall

Texas

1977

$500,000 non-economic

Utah

1986

$300,000 non-economic

Virginia

1977

$1 million overall

Lucas v. United States, 31 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 423 (May 11, 1988)(cap
violates state open courts
guarantee).
Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781
(W.D. Va. 1986), reh'g denied, 672
F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987)(cap
violates federal and state
constitutional rights to trial by
jury).

$350,000 punitive
Washington

$500,000 overall

West Virginia

$1 million overall

Wisconsin

$200,000 overall
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Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d
434 (Wis. 1978)(cap consistent with
state and federal equal protection,
federal due process and state open
courts guarantees).
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Table II
Statutes Limiting Recovery of Damages In Medical Malpractice Lawsuits
NOTE:

Underlined Statutes - Have been declared unconstitutional

STATE

ENACTED

Alaska

1986

CITE
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010(a) and (b) (Supp. 1986)

California

1975

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 1984)

Colorado

1986

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (Supp. 1986)

Florida

1986

1988 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.80 (West)

Idaho

1975

IDAHO CODE § 39-4201 to 39-4213 (1975)(Repealed 1977)

Illinois

1975

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 101. § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1975
(Repealed 1979)

Indiana

1975

IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to 16-9.5-10-5 (Burns Supp. 1988)

Kansas

1986

KAN. STAT. ANN. &60-3402 (Supp. 1987)

Louisiana

1975

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.39 (West Supp. 1988)

Maryland

1986

MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108 (Supp. 1987)

Massachusetts

1986

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988)

Michigan

1986

MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.1483 (Callaghan Supp. 1988)

Minnesota

1986

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.23 (West 1988)

Missouri

1986

MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (Vernon 1988)

Montana

1977

MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-104 (1977)(Repealed 1983)

Nebraska

1976

NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2801 to 44-2855 (1984)

New Hampshire

1979
1986

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 6 507-C:7 (1983)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (Supp. 1987)

New Mexico

1976

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (1986)

North Dakota

1977

N.D. CENT. CODE § 2640-11 (1978)

Ohio

1976

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1984)

South Dakota

1986

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (1987)

Texas

1977

TEX. REV. CIr. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i. §8 11.01-11.05 (Vernon
SUDO. 1988)

Utah

1986

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1987)

Virginia

1977
1987

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (1984)
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1988)

Washington

1986

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (1988)

West Virginia

1986

W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1988)

Wisconsin

1975

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 655.27 (West 1980)
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